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  Towards the middle of his Life of Socrates (c.1440), the first biography of the 
great philosopher written since antiquity, Giannozzo Manetti roundly states that the 
opinions attributed to Socrates in the books of Plato were genuine, and that furthermore 
they were shared by Plato too: 
 
Nullum igitur doctrinae [Socratis] apud nos monumentum extat, nisi si quis forte 
Platonis libros Socratis, magistri sui, monumenta appellare vellet. In quibus fere 
omnibus, cum Socrates loquens exprimatur, eas Socratis sententias fuisse vere 
simul atque eleganter dici potest quae in Platonis dialogis illius verbis efferuntur; 




The remark is one that a modern classical scholar could not but regard as staggeringly 
naïve, given the shelves full of books that have been written over the last two centuries 
attempting to recover the historical Socrates and, in particular, to distinguish his teaching 
from that of Plato. Recent students of Socrates, indeed, tend to despair of finding the 
‘real’ Socrates behind the surviving sources and prefer to speak instead of the images of 
Socrates projected by particular writers, schools and traditions. Hence we have the 
Aristophanic Socrates, a natural philosopher, sophist and free thinker; the pedestrian 
teacher of conventional morality portrayed by Xenophon; the logic-chopping soul-doctor 
of Plato; the skeptical Socrates of the Hellenistic Academy; Cicero’s Socrates, the 
fountainhead of all Greek philosophical schools; the morally ambivalent Socrates of the 
early Christians; and the sublime metaphysical Socrates of the Neoplatonists.
2 But despite 
his remark quoted above, the image of Socrates presented to us by Manetti, deeply 
colored though it is by the Platonic Socrates, nevertheless presents an image of him that 
is in the end quite distinct from Plato’s, both in life and in doctrine. Manetti’s biography 
at first sight appears to be a congeries of quotation and anecdote of varying ideological 
provenance; indeed there is very little in the biography that is not quoted or paraphrased 
from some identifiable source. The argument of this essay is that the seemingly random 
collection of material is in fact carefully curated to achieve a particular purpose; it 
achieves its effect pointillistically by the arrangement and juxtaposition of facts, 
quotations and anecdotes. Manetti selected material from among the numerous 
                                                 
1 Giannozzo MANETTI, Biographical Writings, a cura di S. Baldassarii, Cambridge 
(Massachusetts) 2003, p. 199 (§30).  Subsequent references to Manetti’s Vita Socratis 
will be to the paragraph numbers of this edition. All quotations in English below are from 
Baldassarri’s translation. 
2 Remembering Socrates: Philosophical Essays, a cura di L. Judson and V. Karasmanis, 
Oxford 2006; A Companion to Socrates, a cura di S. Ahbel-Rappe and R. Kamtekar, 
Oxford 2006; Socrates from Antiquity to the Enlightenment, a cura di M. Trapp, 
Aldershot and Burlington 2007. G. VLASTOS, Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher, 
Ithaca (New York) 1991, argues that we have several Socrateses in the dialogues of Plato. ‘Socrateses’ preserved in ancient sources so as to produce a new image of Socrates that is 
intended to make him into an authority for and an exemplum of the humanist cultural 
project.
  Manetti’s Socrates represents the embodiment of what early humanism thought a 
philosopher should be and carries on the humanist critique of contemporary school 
philosophy pioneered by Petrarch and continued by Salutati and Manetti’s teacher, 
Leonardo Bruni.
3 
  Manetti was fortunate in having access to a wider range of sources for the life and 
teaching of Socrates than any previous scholar in Latin Christendom. Analysis of the Vita 
Socratis discloses that he made use of testimonia in Aristotle, Cicero, Valerius Maximus, 
Seneca, Aulus Gellius, Apuleius, Augustine and Jerome. All of these works, to be sure, 
might have been used by a medieval scholar with an exceptional library at his disposal.
4 
But Manetti also benefitted from a number of key sources that only became known in the 
Latin West as a result of the Hellenic revival sparked by Manuel Chrysoloras in the 
decades after 1400. Thus Manetti gained access to Plato’s Phaedo, Crito, Apology, 
Gorgias, and Alcibiades’ speech from the Symposium,
5 translated by his teacher, 
Leonardo Bruni; Xenophon’s Apology of Socrates, also translated by Bruni;
6 and – most 
important of all – the lives of Socrates, his teachers and his disciples that make up book 2 
of Diogenes Laertius’ Lives of the Philosophers, translated into Latin in 1431 by the 
Camaldolese monk, Ambrogio Traversari. Manetti remained ignorant, sadly, of other key 
Greek sources such as the plays of Aristophanes, the rest of the Platonic dialogues and 
the numerous testimonia in the Greek Church Fathers, Lucian, Dio Chrysostom, 
Plutarch’s Moralia, Athenaeus, Maximus of Tyre and, most regrettably, three of the four 
‘Socratic’ works of Xenophon. Though Bessarion translated the Memorabilia in 1442, 
two years after the initial dedication of Manetti’s Socrates to Nuño de Guzmán but a 
decade before the work was rededicated to King Alfonso of Aragon and Naples,
7 it seems 
                                                 
3 On the humanist view of what philosophy should be, see J. HANKINS, Humanism, 
Scholasticism and Renaissance Philosophy, in The Cambridge Companion to 
Renaissance Philosophy, a cura di J. Hankins, Cambridge 2007, pp. 30-48. Fuller details 
on the cultural context of Manetti’s Socrates may be found in J. HANKINS, Socrates in the 
Italian Renaissance, in Socrates from Antiquity, pp. 179-208. 
4 The twelfth-century translations of the Meno and Phaedo by Henricus Aristippus were 
literal to the point of unintelligibility and in any case enjoyed extremely limited 
circulation (though Petrarch and Salutati had copies of the Phaedo version). The only 
work of Plato widely studied in the Middle Ages was the first third of the Timaeus, which 
had been translated into Latin in the fourth century by Calcidius. See J. HANKINS, 
Humanism and Platonism in the Italian Renaissance, I-II, Roma 2003-2004, pp. 93-142. 
5 A Latin text and English translation of the latter is in HANKINS, Socrates, pp. 196-203. 
There are modern editions of Bruni’s two versions of the Crito in Bruni 1983. 
6 The least ambiguous evidence that Manetti read Bruni’s translation of Xenophon’s 
Apology comes at §20, where Manetti says ‘Atque, ita moriens, multiplices humanae 
vitae molestias evitaret’, which echoes Xenophon’s Apologia Socratis 6 and 32, and is 
not paralleled by any passage in Plato or Diogenes Laertius. In the account of Socrates’ 
death Manetti generally follows Plato’s rather than Xenophon’s Apology. 
7 M. PADE, The Reception of Plutarch’s Lives in fifteenth-century Italy, I-II, Kobenhavn 
2007, I, p. 337 (n. 993), makes the interesting point that Alfonso of Aragon was pleased that Manetti did not know the version, or if he did, he chose not to add new material from 
it to his biography after its initial publication. And there is no evidence in the Vita that he 
knew either Xenophon’s Oeconomicus or his Symposium.
8 Nevertheless, Manetti’s 
industry in gathering together relevant texts remains impressive. 
  It cannot be said, however, that the resulting composition was a masterpiece of 
the biographical genre, or that Manetti fully succeeded in digesting his sources and 
producing a coherent picture of the great Athenian philosopher. As stated above, at first 
sight the biography appears to be an ill-assorted patchwork of quotations and paraphrases 
from diverse sources, arranged roughly by topics but with frequent digressions, 
repetitions and awkward transitions. It cannot be compared in clarity of presentation or 
critical acumen with Bruni’s biographies of Cicero, Aristotle, Dante and Petrarch. But 
there are some resemblances in method. Bruni took Plutarch’s life of Cicero as the core 
of his own biography, but then integrated new material, mostly from Cicero’s own works, 
and produced a fresh assessment of the Roman orator’s role in Roman political life and 
his literary merit.
9 Manetti likewise uses material from Diogenes Laertius as the core of 
his own biography, often quoting from or paraphrasing Traversari’s translation, but he 
reorders Diogenes’ material and integrates testimonia from his other sources, while 
cutting out many of the witty sayings and maxims attributed to Socrates as well as much 
titillating gossip and merely antiquarian detail. He vastly expands Diogenes’ brief 
treatments of Socrates’ pedagogy, his daimonion and the account of the trial and death of 
Socrates, where he draws directly on Apuleius’ De deo Socratis and on Bruni’s 
translations. Moreover, in the case of some anecdotes he substitutes a version from 
another source in place of the version found in Diogenes. For example, in telling the story 
of how Socrates’ student Aeschines offered himself to Socrates, Manetti prefers the 
version in Seneca’s De beneficiis to the one in Diogenes, surely because it better 
highlights Socrates’ devotion to the moral improvement of his disciples. 
 
Diogenes Laertius (Venice, 1475), 2.34, tr. Traversari 
 
Cum sibi dixisset Aeschines, Pauper sum, et aliud habeo nihil: me ipsum autem 
tibi do. An vero tu, inquit, non animadvertis quam mihi maxime tradis? 
 
                                                 
to be associated with Socrates (and Seneca), and that Panormita’s anecdotal biography of 
the king, De dictis et factis Alfonsi regis, mirrored the fifteenth-century title of 
Xenophon’s Memorabilia, De dictis et factis Socratis. On this work see also Dennis E. 
Rhodes, Il cardinal Bessarione e Senofonte, in Miscellanea Marciana di studi 
bessarionei (a coronamento del V centenario della donazione nicena), a cura di Rino 
Avesani et al. (Medioevo e Umanesimo, 24), Padova 1976, 353-356, and Michele 
Bandini, I «Memorabili» di Senofonte fra il Bessarione, Isidoro di Kiev e Pier Vettori, 
«Bollettino dei classici», 12 (1991), 83-92.  
8 See J. HANKINS-A. PALMER,  The Recovery of Ancient Philosophy in the Renaissance: 
A Brief Guide, Firenze 2008, pp. 6-7, for the Renaissance recovery of the sources for 
Socrates’ life and teaching. 
9 G. IANZITI, Leonardo Bruni and Biography: the Vita Aristotelis, «Renaissance 
Quarterly» 55.3 (2002), pp. 805-32. Seneca, De beneficiis 1.8.1 
 
Socrati quum multa multi pro suis quisque facultatibus offerrent, Aeschines 
pauper auditor: ‘Nihil, inquit, dignum te, quod dare tibi possim, inuenio, 
et hoc uno modo pauperem me esse sentio. Itaque dono tibi quod unum  
habeo: me ipsum. Hoc munus rogo qualecumque est, boni consulas, cogitesque  
alios, quum multum tibi darent, plus sibi reliquisse’. Cui Socrates : ‘Quidni tu’,  
inquit, ‘mihi magnum munus dederis, nisi forte paruo te aestimas? Habebo itaque 
curae, ut te meliorem tibi reddam quam accepi’. 
 
Manetti, Vita Socratis, cap. 24 
 
Unde Aeschines, unus ex discipulis, cum ita pauper esset ut ob paupertatem neque 
pecuniam neque munera dare posset, ‘Nihil,’ inquit, ‘te dignum invenio quod tibi 
donare valeam, in quo uno me pauperem et inopem esse recognosco. Itaque me 
ipsum, quo nihil carius habeo, tibi do.’ Cui Socrates humanissime simul atque 
liberalissime respondisse fertur: ‘Magnum mihi munus dedisti. Conabor igitur ut 
meliorem te tibi reddam quam acceperim’ (24). 
 
In general, Manetti’s account differs from Diogenes in being far more high-minded in 
tone and panegyrical in purpose. His life of Socrates is in effect a laudatio Socratis: what 
gives it coherence above all is his presentation of Socrates as an exemplar of the moral 
and intellectual virtues. The emphasis on Socrates’ virtues provides Manetti with a 
principle of selection, while his arrangement of materials follows a broadly chronological 
sequence, as can be seen from the following analysis of topics: 
 
Outline of Manetti’s Vita Socratis 
 
1-13  Preface to King Alfonso of Aragon 
13-14  Socrates’ place of birth, parentage, dates 
14-15  His natural gifts, education and military service 
16-17  His turn to ethics and his career as a moral philosopher  
18-20  His studies of dialectic, music, natural philosophy  
20-21  The oracle of Apollo’s judgement about Socrates 
22-26  His teaching and its influence on Greek philosophy 
27-28  His intellectual gifts 
29-30  His profession of ignorance and his irony 
30   Records of Socrates’ life and thought 
31   Socrates as a living oracle. 
32-36  Physical appearance, domestic habits and marriages 
37-38  Public life; his patience 
39-42  His other virtues:  justice, temperance, gentleness 
43-44  His physical toughness and plain living 
45-50  Socrates’ tutelary daimon. 
51-55  The trial and condemnation of Socrates; his courage 
56-61  Imprisonment and death 62  Postumous vindication  




  Manetti’s praise of Socrates’ virtues pursues, implicitly, two broad lines of 
argument. The first is that Socrates perfectly exemplifies the way of life advocated by 
civic humanists like Salutati, Bruni, Poggio, and Manetti himself.
10  Socrates was a 
public-spirited citizen who fought for Athens as a exceptionally brave soldier and who 
held offices and magistracies rarely but with distinction. He could not be corrupted by 
money or honors. He dressed simply and lived frugally. He had so much respect for the 
laws of his city that he refused an easy escape from prison, even though he had been 
unjustly condemned to death, because to break the laws would be factum turpe quoddam 
et scelestum facinum. He married and raised a family. He devoted his life to teaching 
good moral behavior to young Athenians, a service he performed gratis. His studies 
comprehended a wide range of subjects, including letters, logic and natural philosophy. 
Nor was he ignorant of the softer arts, for he wrote poetry, played the lyre, and engaged 
in bodily exercise, including dancing. (Manetti uses Socrates’ example as an excuse to 
argue at length for the seemliness and utility of each of these arts.) But though he had the 
skills of a courtier he rarely travelled, refused offers to join the courts of kings and 
potentates, and preferred life as a citizen of a powerful, free and cultured city (§23). 
He stood outside and above class and party politics and acted as the moral censor 
of Athens. He faced down the recklessness of the mob with great courage, but was also 
ready to speak truth to powerful men. In §38, Manetti juxtaposes two anecdotes from 
Diogenes Laertius and Valerius Maximus to make this point. In the first, Socrates resists 
pressure from ‘thirty extremely powerful men’ (i.e. the oligarchy of the Thirty, which 
ruled Athens in 404/3 BC) and voted to acquit Leon of Salamis, whom they were trying to 
destroy. Although Manetti is paraphrasing Diogenes Laertius (2.24) at this point, he 
chooses to leave out Diogenes’ statement that Socrates was demokratikos.
11 The second 
anecdote, from Valerius Maximus (3.8.ext.3), tells how Socrates used his office as 
President of the Assembly to resist a mob that was raging to commit judicial murder 
against ten generals who had in truth deserved well of the state. So Socrates in Manetti’s 
telling was a partisan of neither the oligarchs nor the demos. He was a kind of moral 
censor who was allowed by right to challenge the mores of his fellow citizens. Manetti is 
careful to say, quoting Cicero, that Socrates had the standing to correct his fellow citizens 
because of his own superhuman virtues, but most people would not enjoy the same right 
to speak against the mores and established customs of their city (§23).  
Florentine civic humanists, like all humanists, placed great emphasis on the need 
to acquire eloquence, but this aspect of Socrates presents Manetti with a challenge in 
assimilating Socrates to the program of humanism. He insists (§18) that Socrates was 
acer et promptus ad dicendum and skilled in the art of discussion (ars disserendi, quam 
                                                 
10 On civic humanism see Renaissance Civic Humanism: Reappraisals and Reflections, a 
cura di J. Hankins, Cambridge 2000. 
11 Traversari translates: ‘Erat autem constantis animi invictaeque sententiae et imprimis 
popularis dominationis studiosus.’ Graeci ‘dialecticen’ appellant), but he stops short of claiming that the Athenian was a 
polished or elegant orator. He was less a fine speaker than an upright teacher (§30). In his 
life of Aristotle (1429) Bruni had had no difficulty in arguing for the eloquence of 
Aristotle, and Guarino had made similar claims about Plato in his 1430 biography,
12 but 
Manetti’s sources were less cooperative. Indeed, he had to contend with Cicero’s positive 
statement that Socrates had been condemned nullam aliam ob culpam nisi propter 
dicendi inscientiam (§54, quoting Cicero’s De oratore 1.54.231-33).  
Manetti responded by discussing at length (§§53-56) the story, preserved in 
several sources, of how the professional orator Lysias had offered Socrates an ‘elegant 
and effective’ speech to give at his trial but had been refused. The story gives Manetti a 
chance to explain that Socrates refused to use Lysias’ speech because it projected a 
dishonorable persona, that of a man who was humble and pleading before his judges, 
rather than that of an innocent and courageous man. Socrates failed to hire an advocate or 
employ himself the arts of rhetoric not because of his imperitia sermonis but because of 
his contemptus mortis (§59). The correct rhetorical strategy to win his case would have 
required him to act dishonorably and deny the value of his previous life. In other words, 
Socrates failure to vindicate himself before his judges was not a rhetorical failure but a 
moral victory. Manetti, himself a famous orator, thus sees Socrates’ trial as a special 
rhetorical situation where losing the case is in reality to win it. It does not entitle us to say 
that Socrates was ignorant of rhetoric, or (as Plato argued in the Gorgias) that there was a 
deep contradiction between the practice of rhetoric and the practice of the philosophical 
life. To elaborate on  latter contrast would have threatened the whole humanistic project, 
but Manetti (like Cicero and most humanists) prefers not to regard the traditional rivalry 
of philosophy and rhetoric as a deep and irreconcilable rift between two forms of 
personal formation. Manetti’s wider message is that the true philosopher is a man of deep 
literary culture, devoted to his city-state, who practices and teaches virtue, embodies 




Manetti’s second broad line of argument in his biography aims to prove that 
Socrates’ conduct and beliefs, and by implication true philosophy, were compatible with 
the teachings of Christianity. Here, as he must have known, his judgment was in direct 
conflict with that of the ancient Church Fathers. The Fathers took a distinctly negative 
view of Socrates – in fact they remain today the primary conduit for our knowledge of the 
ancient pagan anti-Socratic tradition. To be sure, Socrates is sometimes used as a positive 
example when he is being exploited instrumentally for apologetic purposes: how could 
the pagans persecute Christians, the early Fathers asked, when their own hero Socrates 
had also been a monotheist who had been unjustly condemned for rejecting the traditional 
gods? But more typically Socrates was treated as a corrupt representative of the Greek 
philosophical tradition, with which ancient Christians felt themselves to be in rivalry. 
Denigrating the father of philosophy was thus a strategy to establish the moral superiority 
                                                 
12 The Humanism of Leonardo Bruni: Selected Texts, trad. ingl. di G. Griffiths, J. Hankins 
e D. Thompson, Binghamton (New York) 1987, pp. 262-74 (for Bruni’s Life of Aristotle); 
HANKINS, Humanism and Platonism, II, pp. 67-72 (for Guarino’s Life of Plato). of the Christian religion. So Socrates was mocked as a pagan wise man who could not 
control his own lust and anger (Cyril of Alexandria and Theodoret), as a promiscuous 
homosexual and pedophile (Clement of Rome, Tertullian, Cyril), as a self-confessed 
ignoramus (Ps.-Justin, Lactantius and Jerome), as a charlatan and a sophist (the emperor 
Constantine I), and as a demon-worshipper (Tertullian, Minucius Felix, Origen and 
Cyprian).
13 
  For obvious reasons Manetti chose not to engage in any explicit way the Church 
Fathers’ abuse and mockery of Socrates, but he provides emollients to soothe the 
conscience of any reader worried about the suitability of Socrates as a moral model for 
Christians. Following Bruni (and making use of Bruni’s bowdlerized version of the 
speech of Alcibiades in the Symposium
14), Manetti rejects out of hand any suggestion that 
Socrates might have yielded to physical lust for young men like Alcibiades (§§24, 47); he 
tells Cicero’s well-known anecdote about Socrates and the physiognomist Zopyrus (§44) 
to forestall any insinuations that Socrates’ interest in young men might have had any 
other motive than concern for their moral welfare. Diogenes Laertius’ gossipy suggestion 
(2.19) that Socrates had been the paidika or boy lover of his teacher Archelaus is of 
course suppressed, as is his remark, passed with a note of surprise, that ‘there were those 
who said [Socrates] rejected Alcibiades’ extraordinary good looks’ (2.31).
15 Whereas 
Jerome had used as arguments against marriage the comical stories of Socrates’ 
humiliation at the hands of his wives,
16 Manetti recycles Jerome’s anecdotes to illustrate 
Socrates’ supreme virtue of patience (§§33-36). In general, ancient praise of Socrates for 
his enkrateia or self-control in Manetti’s hands becomes praise of him for the Christian 
virtue of patience, just as Manetti turns Socrates’ professions of ignorance into the 
Christian virtue of humility (§29: in hac tam humili nihil sciendi professione). 
  Manetti had a greater hermeneutical challenge in dealing with the story of 
Socrates’ daimonion, the attendant spirit who warned Socrates at key moments of his life 
against taking some course of action. The difficulty was not simply that there are 
numerous passages in the Church Fathers jeering at Socrates’ ‘demon’ and insinuating 
that the fountainhead of Greek philosophy was possessed by an evil demon. The issue 
was even more acute, in that St. Augustine, the chief doctor of the Western Church, had 
spent much of books 8-10 of the City of God arguing against the demonology of the 
Platonists, using Apuleius’ De deo Socratis as his point of departure – the very text 
Manetti uses as his main source in the long discussion (§§45-50) of Socrates’s attendant 
spirit. Augustine argues that demons are not intermediate essences in the Chain of Being 
between the gods and men, as the Platonists had argued. Only Christ can be a true 
intermediary between God and man. Following the Biblical view of demons, Augustine 
denied that there were good demons. For him, as for the Church Fathers generally, all 
                                                 
13 See M. FREDE, The Early Christian Reception of Socrates, in Remembering Socrates, 
188-202; M. EDWARDS, Socrates and the Early Church, in Socrates from Antiquity, pp. 
127-141. 
14 See J. HANKINS, Plato in the Italian Renaissance, I-II, Leiden 1990, I, pp. 80-81; 
HANKINS, Socrates, pp. 187, 190. 
15 Traversari simply transliterates the Greek word paidika, and translates the sentence 
about Alcibiades as: ‘Sunt qui dicant illum Alcibiadis eximiam formam aspernatum.’ 
16 Adv. Jovin. 1.48 (= PL 23: 278). demons were by definition evil (9.19), inferior in metaphysical dignity to mankind, and 
the pagan gods held the same cosmic rank as the demons of the Bible. The position held 
by the gods in the Chain of Being, according to the Platonists, for Augustine was 
reserved for the angels. In his discussion of Apuleius’ book, Augustine leaves open the 
possibility that Socrates’ daimonion might have belonged to a genus of numina different 
from that of the demons:  
 
Aut ergo fallitur Apuleius et non ex isto genere numinum habuit amicum Socrates 
… aut non est Socrati amicitia daemonis gratulanda. De qua usque adeo et ipse 
Apuleius erubuit, ut De deo Socratis praenotaret librum, quem secundum suam 
disputationem, qua deos a daemonibus tam diligenter copioseque discernit, non 
appellare de deo, sed de daemone Socratis debuit. Maluit autem hoc in ipsa 
disputatione quam in titulo libri ponere (8.14). 
 
Manetti seizes on this possibility and asserts positively, as Augustine had not, that 
Socrates’ daimonion was a good angel.
17 According to a long-established theological 
tradition in the Church, all men had a good angel to act as their guardian, guide and 
educator, and a bad angel to test their faith.
18 Manetti asserts that this was the case with 
Socrates, with the difference that Socrates, ‘owing to his unique and conspicuous moral 
excellence,’ always obeyed his good angel, never his bad (§46).  
This was an extraordinary assertion of the attainability of human moral excellence 
in the absence of Christian grace, dubious in its theological orthodoxy, and prima facie 
one might conjecture that Manetti believed Socrates to have access, via his daimonion, to 
non-human sources of wisdom denied to other men qua men. There are a few statements 
in the biography that might lend themselves to this interpretation.
19  But Manetti 
explicitly closes off the possibility that the daimonion is a vehicle of moral knowledge. 
Following Apuleius,
20 the Florentine distinguishes sharply between Socrates’ natural 
wisdom, which was sufficient for moral guidance, and the guidance of the daimonion, 
                                                 
17 It is this that no doubt accounts for Manetti’s view of the daimonion as offering 
generalized moral counsel and guidance (like the daimonion in Xenophon’s Socratic 
works) as opposed to the Platonic view of the daimonion who offers only ‘intuitive 
certainty concerning the non-rectitude of a quite particular action [Socrates] was 
contemplating’ (A. A. Long, How Does Socrates’ Divine Sign Communicate with Him? 
in A Companion, p. 67). For Xenophon’s interpretation of the daimonion see L.-A. 
Dorion, Xenophon’s Socrates, ibid., p. 96, and Gera in Socrates from Antiquity, p. 38. 
Slightly later Manetti becomes evasive on the subject of the daimonion’s cosmic rank: 
‘Hunc ergo bonum sive angelum sive daemonem sive deum (sic enim varie, ut tradit 
Augustinus, a plerisque appellatur) …’.  
18 See Peter Lombard, Sentences 2.11.1. Manetti reasserts this doctrine, using Socrates as 
an example of its application to non-Christian figures, in G. MANETTI, De dignitate 
hominis, a cura di E. R. Leonard, Padova 1975, pp. 89-90 (§42). 
19 For instance the statement at §28 that the Socratic paradoxes were thought by others to 
be divinely inspired, or the statement at §32 that he was ‘an earthly oracle of human 
wisdom’ whose utterances were thought to be divine even by philosophers. 
20 17.157-58; see also Xenophon’s Apologia Socratis 12-13. who provided prophetic knowledge of the future.
21 Socrates’ wisdom remains natural, not 





  It is when we come to the content of Socrates wisdom, his actual teachings, that 
Manetti’s Socrates least resembles the Platonic and Stoic Socrateses and most resembles 
the skeptical and Xenophontean ones. Manetti’s account of Socrates’ moral teaching is 
likely to surprise and disappoint the modern reader, for the Florentine is completely silent 
about the doctrines associated with Socratic moral philosophy that modern scholars 
consider most important and characteristic. Manetti does not for instance mention the 
Socratic teachings 
 
1) that no one does wrong willingly: that if we had true knowledge of virtue, we would 
always behave virtuously; 
2) that all virtue is one: that striving for the virtues is a unified process, related in various 
ways to a single search for wisdom and rationality in one’s behavior patterns, and that the 
virtues cannot conflict with each other; 
3) that self-mastery is the foundation of virtue, and virtue is both a necessary and 
sufficient condition for happiness; that virtue is to the soul as health is to the body; and 
that this kind of virtue cannot be taught;
22   
4) that the unexamined life is not worth living; it is the only way to root out the errors 
that have damaged one’s soul, errors that have their origin in false beliefs inherited from 
traditional religion and corrupt social values; 
5) that only the wise man is truly free; a life not regulated by reason is a life of slavery to 
the passions and appetites; 
6) that the correct method in moral philosophy is to examine the internal consistency of 
one’s beliefs through a process of question-and-answer; that false beliefs have to be 
rooted out by use of the elenchus; and that exchanging long speeches – macrologia as the 
practice is called in the Gorgias (449b, 461a-462b) – does not lead to true knowledge. 
 
All of these doctrines are well attested in sources demonstrably known to Manetti, so his 
decision to omit them must in some sense be intentional. Given what has already been 
said, we can guess some of the reasons. The humanists themselves, from the time of 
Petrarch onwards, claimed that virtue could be learned by reading classical texts, and that 
ancient eloquence and oratory were vital instruments for the spread of virtue throughout 
the ruling classes and down the social pyramid. So they would not have been sympathetic 
to Socrates’ method, which regularly involved humiliation of an opponent. In their own 
dialogues they almost always imitated Ciceronian macrologia and not the Socratic 
                                                 
21 §49: ‘Eodem modo Socrates agebat; nam ubi consilio, propria sapientia; ubi vero 
praesagia, vi daemonis utebatur.’ 
22 At §40 Manetti does remark, without further discussion, that ‘beatam vitam una virtute 
contineri prorsus existimabat [Socrates]’. dialogue as illustrated in the early works of Plato.
23 Manetti surely also wanted to avoid 
obvious conflicts with Christian assumptions about human nature and the human need for 
salvation by God.  The Pauline and Augustinian versions of Christianity in particular 
emphasized the weakness of the human intellect and the inability of human virtue to 
achieve on its own the standards set by God for man. Despite Manetti’s claims for 
Socrates’ nearly superhuman virtue, to explicate Socrates’ teachings in detail, which 
emphasize the power of natural human reason to educe virtue, wisdom and happiness, 
would probably have invited too explicit a comparison with settled Christian dogmas. 
  Nevertheless, Manetti does discuss a few of Socrates’ teachings and intellectual 
commitments. He spends the most space discussing Socrates’ ‘ethical turn’: the story 
preserved in numerous sources that after his early studies with Anaxagoras and Archelaus 
of natural science (naturalis historia Manetti calls it), Socrates abandoned these studies 
and turned instead to ethics, a subject which he is deemed to have practically invented. 
Thus, in the much-repeated phrase, he brought philosophy down from the skies and 
placed it in the cities and even the homes of men. Manetti is fascinated by this story, as 
Petrarch, Salutati and Bruni had been before him, because it seemed to authorize the 
aspirations of the early humanists for their own culture. They wanted philosophy to 
abandon the fruitless obscurities of Aristotelian logic and natural philosophy as taught in 
the universities and to embrace a more civil philosophy, concerned with behavior and 
human affairs. That philosophy should be studied by statesmen engaged in the active life, 
not by contemplatives or by a specialized caste of experts. Echoing Petrarch’s De 
ignorantia, Manetti faults Aristotle for merely describing virtue rather than making his 
readers desire it. 
 
Insuper, licet Aristoteles de definiendis atque inter se distinguendis animi 
virtutibus probe egregieque tractaverit, nihil tamen accurate legentibus attulisse 
videbatur quo virtutes ardentius appeterentur, vita enixius evitarentur. Quod 
Socrates et Plato praecipue apud Graecos, apud nostros vero Cicero et Seneca 
prae ceteris fecisse laudantur, ut suasionibus suis ad incredibilem quendam 
virtutum amorem simul atque vitiorum detestationem et dormientes homines et 
aliud agentes vehementius excitarentur. (§22).
24 
 
Socrates was superior to Aristotle for the same reason a humanistic education was 
superior to a scholastic one: the student acquired not merely theoretical knowledge of a 
discipline, but (in principle at least) a genuine love for virtue and a hatred for vice. 
Manetti’s explanation for why Socrates embraced the ‘ethical turn’ reflects these 
convictions. He offers three explanations (§15). The first, from Cicero (Acad. 1.4), is that 
Socrates was skeptical that anything certain or true could be known; this is described as 
                                                 
23 The single exception known to the present writer is Raffaele Lippi Brandolini’s De 
comparatione regni et reipublicae (c.1490), for which see Hankins, Humanism and the 
Origins of Modern Political Thought, in The Cambridge Companion to Renaissance 
Humanism, a cura di J. Kraye, Cambridge 1996, pp. 132-133. For Bruni’s encounter with 
Socrates’ critique of rhetoric in the Gorgias, see Hankins, Plato, I, pp. 53-58. 
24 The whole passage should be compared to FRANCESCO PETRARCA, Invectives, tr. ingl. 
di D. Marsh, Cambridge (Massachusetts) 2003, p. 314 (De ignorantia §107). the vetus opinio of the Academics. The second explanation, Diogenes Laertius (2.21), is 
that Socrates believed naturalis historia to be fruitless for bene beateque vivendum. The 
third, which comes from Augustine’s City of God (8.3), is that Socrates believed that 
moral philosophy was a via purgativa and that moral purification was a necessary 
prerequisite before ascending to knowledge of the highest and most divine studies. Of 
these explanations Manetti seems to endorse both the first and the second, though he later 
(§19) amends the first and states that Socrates had knowledge of the subject matter of 
natural philosophy (physica) but regarded its conclusions as uncertain. 
  For Manetti this raised the whole problem of Socratic ignorance and what exactly 
it entailed and how it was related to his skepticism. As a humanist in the Petrarchan mold 
Manetti preferred that his hero not manifest any skepticism so radical that it would 
undermine the assumptions of humanist literary education or challenge Christian belief. 
He therefore links Socrates’ professions of ignorance with his habit of irony (which 
Manetti, following Cicero, translates as dissimulatio).
25 In professing his ignorance he is 
merely adopting an ironic pose, akin to Christian humility, whose goal is to point the 
contrast with self-proclaimed experts and sophists who in reality lacked any true 
knowledge (§§19, 29, 30). In fact, as Manetti repeatedly points out, Socrates was being a 
maximus ironicus: he was positively bursting with knowledge of many arts and sciences, 
and indeed founded the whole science of ethics. Manetti brings the subject to a close by 
quoting Aristotle (Eth. Nic. 4.13, 1127b): ‘It is the ironist who boasts the least, as 
Socrates used to do, who insisted on his total ignorance despite his vast knowledge.’ 
  The other Socratic doctrines are equally instrumentalized to reinforce the portrait 
of Socrates that Manetti wishes to paint. He mentions that Aristotle was ‘contradicted, 
mocked and … despised by Aristotle … for having defined virtue as knowledge’ (20). 
But instead of a defense of Socrates’ teaching, Manetti tries to refute Aristotle by 
reiterating the point that Socrates was himself considered wise and exemplary in his 
moral behavior by ‘the consensus of all mankind and the divine oracle of Apollo’. The 
point is so irrelevant that one might suspect an authorial mishap of some kind. But it 
seems more likely that Manetti believed that the truth of Socrates’ doctrine could be 
established by appeal to his authority rather than by argument. Thus the single most 
important Socratic doctrine is mentioned only as a hook to drag in yet another assertion 
of Socrates’ wisdom and to hit at the scholastics’ favorite authority Aristotle. A mention 
of Socrates’ supposed teaching that there is no distinction between the honestum and the 
utile (§17) is cited merely to prove Socrates’ influence on the Stoics. 
  The only teaching of Socrates that Manetti foregrounds, and indeed labels the 
Socraticum decretum, is the doctrine that it is better to suffer than commit injustice (§39). 
Manetti mentions this to illustrate Socrates’ deep understanding of the virtue of justice. 
The Florentine no doubt learned of this doctrine from Bruni’s translation of the Gorgias, 
and Bruni had also highlighted the doctrine in the preface to his translation, directed to 
Pope John XXIII,
26 and later in the preface to his translation of Aristotle’s Politics, 
dedicated to Pope Eugene IV (1437): 
 
                                                 
25 On Socratic irony in the Renaissance, see D. KNOX, Ironia: Medieval and Renaissance 
Ideas on Irony, Leiden 1989. 
26 HANKINS, Plato, I, 53-58; see also II, 496-97. Socrates apud Platonem in eo libro, qui appellatur Gorgias [473a], ostendit 
deterius esse iniuriam facere quam pati; adeoque id probat, ut ad extremum dicat 
adamantinis rationibus esse probatum, quod facere iniuriam longe deterius est, 
quam iniuriam pati. In eodem libro Socrates docet: «Si iniuriam quis nobis fecerit, 
non esse vindictam a nobis faciendam» [474b-476a, 509c-511a]. 
 
Socrates, according to Plato  in the book called Gorgias, shows that it is worse to 
inflict than to suffer an injury. And he presses the argument to the point of saying 
that he has proved by the severest logic that it is far worse to inflict than to suffer 
an injury. In the same book Socrates teaches that if someone does us an injury, we 
should not seek vengeance. What kind of teachings, by God, are these? Are they 
not divine, are they not very similar to Christian perfection?
27 
 
This is the only Socratic doctrine in the entire biography to which Manetti gives any 
emphasis, and the reason why is not far to seek. It is this doctrine which best makes the 
case for considering Socratic wisdom a useful philosophical endorsement of Christ’s 
most difficult admonitions:  to love one’s enemies and to turn the other cheek rather than 
resist an evil person. The unique status of the doctrine in his biography also underlines 
for the modern historian Manetti’s decisive rejection of the patristic view of Socrates and 
its replacement by a new, Renaissance image of Socrates:  a civic humanist who is a 
paragon of conventional virtue, a good citizen and educator who, if not actually a 





                                                 
27 Latin text in LEONARDO BRUNI, Sulla perfetta traduzione, a cura di P. Viti, Napoli 
2004, p. 278; English translation in The Humanism, p. 158. 